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"TAKE THIS JOB AND SHOVE IT": THE RISE
OF FREE LABOR
Jonathan A. Bush*
THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE, 1350-1870. By

Robert J. Steinfeld. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
1991. Pp. viii, 277. $39.95.

Sooner or later in their first-year curriculum, most law students
learn of the contracts doctrine that denies plaintiffs the remedy of specific performance for breaches of personal services and labor contracts.1 Courts deny specific performance for a number of sensible
reasons. The party in breach would be unlikely to perform the promise enthusiastically, and supervision by the promisee would create an
awkward situation. But the courts occasionally mention another,
more archaic reason for denying specific performance: forcing a defaulting employee to complete the contract would be akin to placing
him into involuntary servitude, even slavery.2
Simply put, Robert Steinfeld's The Invention of Free Labor 3 uses
• Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School, Yeshiva University. A.B.
1975, Princeton; B.Litt. 1977, Trinity College Oxford University; J.D. 1980, Yale. - Ed. The
title is borrowed from the song of the same name, "Take this Job and Shove It." Johnny
Paycheck, Take This Job and Shove It, on TAKE THIS JOB AND SHOVE IT (CBS Records 1977).
As usual, I thank Guyora Binder, Peter Coffman, Laird Hart, Lisa Lang, and Ruth Robbins. J.
H. Baker and Robert C. Stacey graciously shared unpublished manuscripts with me. Professor
Stacey, John S. Beckerman, and Paul Finkelman gave me the benefit of their critical comments.
Elena Goyanes and Charles Szurgot provided valuable research assistance. I thank them all. I
also thank the editors of the Michigan Law Review for invaluable editorial assistance. Special
thanks are due to David Bleich, David Carlson, Drucilla Cornell, Edward de Grazia, Eva Hanks,
Jonathan Silver, and Richard Weisberg. The review is dedicated to Isabel Anna Bush, whose
mother labored on her behalf.
1. See, e.g., De Rivafinoli v. Corsetti, 4 Paige Ch. 264, 270 (N.Y. Ch. 1833); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367 (1981); WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
CONTRACT § 409, at 520-22 (Arthur L. Corbin ed., 5th ed. 1930).
2. See, e.g., Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310, 318 (7th Cir. 1894); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS§ 367 cmt. a (1981); OLIVER w. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 235 (Mark D.
Howe ed., 1963) (1881). Holmes rejects
the superfluous theory that contract is a qualified subjection of one will to another, a kind of
limited slavery. It might be so regarded if the law compelled men to perform their contracts, or if it allowed promisees to exercise such compulsion. If, when a man promised to
labor for another, the law made him do it, his relation to his promisee might be called a
servitude ad hoc with some truth. But that is what the law never does.
Id. For a modem critique of the indentured servitude rationale in the context of bankruptcy and
family law, see Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation ofHuman Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383,
431-32, 444-54 (1993).
3. Robert J. Steinfeld is a Professor of Law at the State University of New York at Buffalo
School of Law.
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this doctrinal backwater in contract law to reinterpret the history of
Anglo-American labor law. On one level, Steinfeld offers an extended
exploration of the recent development and mendacity of the no-specific-performance rule. The Case of Mary Clark, in which the Indiana
Supreme Court declined to permit specific performance to enforce indentured servitude, is conventionally seen as a contract case, articulating the familiar common law rule against coercive performance.4 Far
from being a mere building block in the Langdellian world of contracts, the rule against coercive performance enunciated in Mary Clark
and elsewhere was a fundamental element of the emerging nineteenthcentury notion of "free labor." Equally important, the rule was a radical departure from long-standing common law doctrines of how employees ought to be governed. Mary Clark represented a critical
turning point in labor law and in the social understanding of what it
means to be a free worker and citizen.
Drawing upon legal material like the case of Mary Clark, Professor
Steinfeld's book offers a complete reinterpretation of the evolution of
labor law. It is a broad story, with its roots in medieval serfdom and
its culmination in the "free labor" ideology of the nineteenth century.
The argument is daring, for Steinfeld claims that the received understanding of labor law history is right about its starting point (medieval
serfdom) and its conclusion (free labor), but little else. In particular,
the traditional account completely misses both the importance of coercion in regulating labor and the absence, until relatively recently, of a
modem understanding of free labor and persons.
Steinfeld traces the tenacity of coerced labor, including specialized
relationships like indentured servitude and apprenticeship, and also
the modem-style wage relationships of "servants in husbandry" (agricultural laborers) and craftsmen. Before the nineteenth century, a dissatisfied employee in any of these working relationships was not free to
leave. Both English and colonial American law required employees to
complete their contractual terms of service or the tasks for which they
had been retained on pain of specific performance and criminal sanctions (pp. 8, 13, 40-52). In many instances, the law also required persons not already employed to find a "master" and enter into a longterm contract (pp. 22-23, 33). Steinfeld's analysis is original in that he
takes the next step, combining this description of the forms of compelled labor with the seemingly unrelated fact that common law had
long concluded that practically all Englishmen were personally free.
The result is a new, complex picture of early modem freedom, illustrating the perfect consistency of legally free status, of which contemporaries were so proud, with a regime of harsh compelled labor.
Steinfeld also explores the legal collapse of these various forms of
4. Pp. 143-49, 156, 175 (discussing The Case of Mary Clark, a Woman of Color, l Blackf.
122 (Ind. 1821)).
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coerced labor and their replacement with modem notions of "free labor" in the early nineteenth century. Henceforth, there would not be
degrees of practical "unfreedom"; both labor and personal status were
exclusively free or slave. Compulsion persisted longest in the institutions of indentured service and apprenticeship, chiefly on the rationale
that, however coercive those institutions were, they were voluntary.
Unfree labor was thereby consistent with contractarian individualism
(pp. 90-91, 105-11). But if ideological accommodation permitted coerced labor to persist into the era of capitalism, it was also ideology
rather than economics that led to its final rejection. Steinfeld argues
that, in the early nineteenth century, the increasing opposition of
working people to coerced labor forced common law judges to view
even voluntary coerced labor as little different from slavery, and hence
as illegitimate (pp. 94, 123-27, 159, 163).
To make this ambitious set of claims, Steinfeld relies on an impressive command of sprawling bodies of legal and historical scholarship
- English and colonial and antebellum American. The result is an
account that on the whole is compelling. Regardless of its ultimate
success, the Steinfeld account is the most ambitious attempt in many
decades to grapple with the intellectual history of Anglo-American labor law. In an age of scholarly monographs, Steinfeld has undertaken
a task of almost heroic sweep.
I.

THE TRADITIONAL ACCOUNT OF LABOR LAW
AND ITS PROBLEMS

What is the matter with the traditional account of labor law? It
offers a smooth explanation of the legal shifts from thirteenth-century
serfdom to nineteenth-century wage labor, largely by identifying legal
change as a corollary to social, economic, and demographic trends.
According to this account, laborers were largely unfree and immobile
in the medieval period, but they secured legal freedom in the favorable
economic climate of the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. After
that time, most Englishmen worked for wages, and what quaintly became known as the law of "master and servant" was, for all but resident household servants and apprentices, the law of employeremployee. At the heart of this traditional account is the early date at
which laboring men and women became legally free.
Before considering the difficulties - for both Steinfeld and this
reviewer - with the traditional account, it is necessary to sketch out
its major arguments more fully. In the High Middle Ages, English
society was overwhelmingly agrarian, and labor was unfree. This
characterization is axiomatic for serfs or "villeins," since the essence
of their legal status lay in their being bound to the soil and obliged to
provide their manorial lords with labor services. But even persons of
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legally free status might owe labor services in exchange for their land. 5
While these free persons formally could withdraw their labor, as a
practical matter few wanted to abandon their land. 6 Moreover, the
separation of personal status and land tenure under early common law
meant that personally free peasants could hold land by unfree tenure
involving labor services. As a result, many medieval persons, whether
legally free or not, lived under a regime of coerced labor.
All this began to change by the fourteenth century. A century of
prosperity had brought rural England close to the Malthusian trap:
too many mouths, overintensive cultivation, and declining crop
yields. 7 Many lords commuted labor obligations, replacing serf labor
with cheaper hired labor, 8 and elsewhere serfs fled in search of opportunity. The decline of manorial serfdom was accelerated by the Black
Death, which carried off approximately one third of the population. 9
With labor suddenly scarce, both serfs and free peasants managed to
cut better deals for themselves. In what was tantamount to a lengthy
nationwide process of renegotiation and redistribution, peasants took
on larger landholdings of better land and on more favorable terms,
owing money rents rather than labor in kind - all backed by the new
power of their actual or implicit threats to withdraw labor and move
to a new lord. For some 150 years, the relative scarcity of labor gave
the upper hand to smallholders and laborers. 10 Significantly, the peas-

s.

5. See, e.g., H.
BENNETT, LIFE ON THE ENGLISH MANOR: A STUDY OF PEASANT CONDITIONS 1150-1400, at 103 (1937) (terming labor services by free tenants "exceptional"); EDWARD MILLER, THE ABBEY AND BISHOPRIC OF ELY 128-29, 141 (1951) (documenting free men
owing similar services to those of unfree men, including labor); 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC \V. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 37071 (2d ed. 1968) (stressing uncertainty of labor, rather than labor services, as a test of villein
tenure); CUSTUMALS OF THE MANORS OF LAUGHTON, WILLINGDON AND GORING xxx, 3-8
(Arthur E. Wilson ed., 60 Sussex Record Socy. 1961).
6. John Hatcher, English Serfdom and Villeinage: Towards a Reassessment, PAST & PRESENT, Feb. 1981, at 3, 16-24.
7. See H.E. HALLAM, RURAL ENGLAND 1066-1348, at 245-64 (1981); Edward Miller, The
English Economy in the Thirteenth Century: Implications of Recent Research, PAST & PRESENT,
July 1964, at 21, 33-36.
8. The modern debate on commutation was begun by Professor Michael Postan. MICHAEL
M. POSTAN, The Chronology of Labour Services, 20 TRANS. ROY. HIST. Soc. 169 (4th ser. 1937),
reprinted in EssAYS ON MEDIEVAL AGRICULTURE AND GENERAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEDIEVAL ECONOMY 89 (1973) [hereinafter POSTAN, Chronology]. See Evsey D. Domar, The Causes
of Slavery or Serfdom: A Hypothesis, 30 J. EcoN. HIST. 18, 29 (1970), reprinted in EvsEY D.
DOMAR, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM & SERFDOM 225, 235-36 (1989) (surveying thirteenth-century
commutation and suggesting an economic model).
9. See, e.g., PHILIP ZIEGLER, THE BLACK DEATH 238 (1969).
10. EDWARD P. CHEYNEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INDUSTRIAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY
OF ENGLAND 108-09 (rev. ed. 1929); CHRISTOPHER DYER, STANDARDS OF LIVING IN THE
LATER MIDDLE AGES: SOCIAL CHANGE IN ENGLAND C. 1200-1520, at 216-17 (1989); PAUL
D.A. HARVEY, A MEDIEVAL OXFORDSHIRE VILLAGE: CUXHAM, 1240 TO 1400, at 139 (1965);
Michael M. Postan, The Fifteenth Century, 9 ECON. HIST. REV. 160, 166 (1939). Of course the
picture is more complex than this sketch permits. See, e.g., J.L. BOLTON, MEDIEVAL ENGLISH
EcONOMY, 1150-1500, at 211-14 (1980) (demesne farmers prosper until 1370s); DYER, supra, at
231 (masters probably forced their increasingly costly labor force to work harder); HARVEY,
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antry of England was able to win not only better economic terms, but
also de facto or even legal freedom.
·
This wresting of legal freedom was not achieved without struggle.
There had long been manorial and burghal rules forbidding free movement of labor and mandating customary wages (p. 28), and the Ordinance of Laborers (1349) and the Statute of Laborers (1351) adapted
these rules for national application (pp. 22-23, 28-30). Through these
acts, manorial lords and a national government responsive to their interests tried to restrain the mobility of labor and the level of wages.
But legislation could not successfully restrain wages and labor mobility in the face of landowners who were interested in controlling their
own workers and luring their neighbors' workers, and laborers who
knew how to flee, purchase exemptions, resist forcibly, and use the
litigation process. I I Legislation also could not stand in the way of
strong demographic and economic trends. I 2 Since unfree peasants and
laborers consistently sought free status, the decline of serfdom was inevitable. I3 By the late fourteenth century, serfdom was clearly on the
wane, and by the mid-sixteenth century it was all but gone.
The decline of English serfdom did not mean that peasants and
laborers continued to enjoy rising standards of living. On the contrary, living standards tended to fall from the early sixteenth century,
dispossession of the peasantry accelerated, and the ranks of the landless and the poor swelled. I 4 The traditional account of labor law was
based in part on these findings. Indeed, the early twentieth-century
supra, at 139-40 (small farmers were thrown back on family labor only, since hired labor was
now too expensive); RODNEY H. HILTON, THE DECLINE OF SERFDOM IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND
38-43 (2d ed. 1969) (lords attempted to reimpose feudal obligations and occasionally succeeded).
11. For the various forms of peasant resistance, see HILTON, supra note 10, at 35-43; ROD•
NEY H. HILTON, THE ENGLISH PEASANTRY IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES 64-73 (1975);
GEORGE C. HOMANS, ENGLISH VILLAGERS OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY 276-81 (1941);
Rodney H. Hilton, Peasant Movements in England Before 1381, 2 ECON. HIST. REV. 2 (2d ser.
1949), reprinted in 2 EssAYS IN EcONOMIC HISTORY 73 (E.M. Cams-Wilson ed., 1962) and in
RODNEY H. HILTON, CLASS CONFLICT AND THE CRISIS OF FEUDALISM 122 (1985). But see
MICHAEL M. POSTAN, Legal Status and Economic Conditions in Medieval Villages, in EssAYS
ON MEDIEVAL AGRICULTURE AND GENERAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEDIEVAL ECONOMY, supra
note 8, at 278, 283-84 (few peasants bothered to purchase formal manumission) [hereinafter PosTAN, Legal Status]; J.Z. Trrow, ENGLISH RURAL SOCIETY 1200-1350, at 58-59 (1969) (ques·
tioning whether various instances of peasant resistance were not exceptional).
12. See, e.g., DYER, supra note 10, at 218-19 (legal regulation widely thought ineffective,
though statutes possibly succeeded in deterring some labor mobility and wage demands); Demar,
supra note 8, at 29 (legislation ineffective against economic forces). Indeed, modem free market
disciples have often cited the late medieval statutes for the general proposition that wage-price
controls never work to restrain market forces in the long run.
13. Trrow, supra note 11, at 58. But see I.S. Leadam, The Last Days ofBondage in England,
9 L.Q. REV. 348 (1893) (arguing that villeinage persisted until the late sixteenth century).
14. See, e.g., A.L. BEIER, MASTERLESS MEN: THE VAGRANCY PROBLEM IN ENGLAND,
1560-1640, at 18-24 (1985); HILTON, supra note 10, at 57; W.G. HOSKINS, THE AGE OF PLUNDER: KING HENRY'S ENGLAND, 1500-1547, at 60-72 (1976); JOHN POUND, POVERTY AND
VAGRANCY IN TUDOR ENGLAND 3-25 (1971); PAUL SLACK, THE ENGLISH POOR LAW 15311782, at 11 (1990).
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landmark histories of labor and poverty were typically written by reformers and social activists. 15 The reformers knew of the massive rural dispossession of the peasantry beginning in the sixteenth century of which Sir Thomas More famously warned 16 - and of the dangers
of an increasing population and price inflation in a subsistence economy. The reformers also knew of the contemporary perception that
poverty and vagrancy were on the rise and that the highways, forests,
and cities swarmed with "masterless men."
The traditional account of labor law provides, however, that English labor enjoyed legally free status from an early date, approximately
the late Middle Ages. 17 When common law's only unfree status villeinage - fell into desuetude in the century after the Black Death,
all persons necessarily were free. 18 The enforcement of the late medieval labor statutes represented the attempt to extract labor from free
men, and the governance of labor was a separate question from that of
personal status. As for early modem labor statuses and institutions
that bore the hallmarks of unfreedom - such as apprenticeship, servitude by annual retainer or indenture, impressment into military service, and bridewell work pursuant to the poor relief acts 19 - the
traditional account holds that they did not imply unfree personal status. Only villeinage could constitute common law servitude, and, as
Sir Thomas Smith wrote in the 1560s, "[n]either of the one sort [villeins in gross] nor of the other [villeins regardant] have we any number
in England. And of the first I never knewe any in the realme in my
time: of the seconde so fewe there be, that it is not almost worth the
speaking." 20 In much the way that modem lawyers reconcile coercive
institutions like prison labor and conscripted military service with the
Thirteenth Amendment, traditional historians of labor law insist that
the early modem institutions were temporary, voluntary, regulated by
paternalistic oversight, or otherwise distinguishable from legal servitude. England had "too pure an air for slaves to dwell in," 21 meaning
15. See the works cited infra note 89.
16. THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA 32-33 (Mildred Campbell ed., Walter J. Black, Inc. 1947)
(1516).
17. See, e.g., RICHARD H. TAWNEY, THE AGRARIAN PROBLEM IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 43 (1912).
18. A famous assertion of this is found in antislavery cases like Somerset. There it was argued that English law knew only villeinage unfreedom, a slave was not a villein, therefore English law did not recognize slavery. Somerset v. Stewart, Lofft I, 3; 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 500 (K.B.
1772).
19. See, e.g., THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 137-38 (L. Alston ed., Cambridge University Press 1906) (1583) ("An other kinde of servitude or bondage is used in Englande for the necessitie thereof, which is called apprenticehoode. But this is onely by covenaunt,
and for a time, and during the time it is vera servitus . . . . Besides apprentises, others be ...
called servaunts ... which be not in such bondage as apprentises ....").
20. Id. at 130-31.
21. Pp. 96, 225 n.10. For similar legal talk in France, see ROBIN BLACKBURN, THE OVER-
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that English labor, however oppressed in fact or in law, was fundamentally free labor, subject to regulation only at the margins.
Steinfeld bridles against this traditional account, and there is much
to support his discomfiture. The peasants and laborers of medieval
England were not uniformly unfree. Many, perhaps most, manors relied on hired work, often performed by landless men, in addition to the
labor of serfs holding land by precarious customary terms. 22 These
hired workers and their payments, in wages or grain ("liveries"), may
seem like a distortion of classic feudal theory, but they were structural
features of English manorialism, The picture of a largely unfree peasantry exchanging its labor for land is simply incomplete. Indeed, in
the twelfth century, wage labor became a dominant form of labor, as
lords and long-term lessees of manors ("farmers") commuted the labor obligations of peasants and replaced the serfs with hired laborers. 23 Twelfth-century lords were capable of behaving like profitmaximizing employers of free labor, rather than like feudal lords saddled with customary labor. 24
Significantly, these hired laborers tended to be free, de facto and
sometimes de jure. 25 Perhaps their freedom meant little more than
that they were free to move when pushed and free to accept the least
unattractive employment offer; if so, medieval hired laborers were free
in a way that their nineteenth-century descendants might have found
familiar. But the traditional account of labor also distorts medieval
freedom more generally by presenting almost all labor as coerced, dependent, and ipso facto unfree. Long before the Black Death, money
payments replaced labor service on many manors, such that even villeins often did not render labor under coercion; instead, their "labor
service" was a measure of additional rent and a badge of their formal
status. When lords sought to extract customary labor or pay below
market wages, peasants often resisted, challenging both the obligation
to work and its implication of unfree status. 26 In fact, we have only
recently realized the profound complexity of legal status and personal
THROW OF COLONIAL SLAVERY 1776-1848, at 41 (1988); DAVID B. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF
SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE 46 (1966).
22. MICHAEL M. POSTAN, THE FAMULUS: THE ESTATE LABOURER IN THE TWELFTH
AND THE THIRTEENTH CENTURIES 30-31 (1954); MICHAEL M. POSTAN, THE MEDIEVAL
EcONOMY AND SOCIETY 148-49, 224-25 (1972); see also ALAN MACFARLANE, THE ORIGINS OF
ENGLISH INDIVIDUALISM 148-50 (1978) (stressing importance of landless wage laborers and servants, as part of a larger argument that medieval England did not have a "peasantry").
23. POSTAN, Chronology, supra note 8, at 93-100.
24. But see Edward Miller, England in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries: An Economic
Contrast?, 24 EcoN. HIST. REV. l, 7-8 (2d ser. 1971) (arguing that lords often made the "wrong"
- that is, unprofitable - decision in continuing to farm out their lands and in not retaining
labor services for demesne farming, and that they did so for traditionalist reasons).
25. But see DYER, supra note 10, at 217-18 (landless serfs working for wages were not meaningfully free); MILLER, supra note 5, at 142 (landless serfs working elsewhere as servants still had
residual value to their lords).
26. RODNEY H. HILTON, BOND MEN MADE FREE 154-56 (1973).
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and tenurial freedom that existed from the late eleventh to mid-thirteenth centuries. 27 Certainly common law villeinage, as it was devised
in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries, was not simply a restatement of traditional unfree status. Rather, villeinage was a particular
configuration of legal disabilities and tests, cast in new binary (freeunfree) form and imposed on at least some persons who had always
considered themselves free or free enough.
Nor does the traditional narrative satisfactorily explain sixteenthand seventeenth-century "free labor." The traditional account insists
that labor institutions such as indentured servitude, apprenticeship,
and military impressment operated on free persons and were consistent with their personal freedom. But these were coercive and frequently brutal practices, and in more candid moments contemporaries
recognized that they differed little from slavery or serfdom (p. 101).
Given the prevalence of these practices, there is little to gain from
denying that the common law sanctioned certain forms of servile labor, and much to commend in characterizing early modern labor as
significantly unfree.
If anything, coercive labor practices seemed to expand in the early
modern period. It is very well to point, as generations of common
lawyers have, to the short life of the notorious Vagrancy Act of
1547,28 the only statute that expressly created a slave status for Englishmen. The act was repealed almost immediately after its enactment, and most commentators took its repeal to support the
proposition that English law would tolerate no status but freedom.
But the arrangements routinely made under the Old Poor Law for
paupers, including forcible work in bridewells29 and the placement of
pauper children as "parish apprentices" (p. 120) in dangerous occupations, were harshly coercive. 30 Moreover, late Tudor evidence shows
that men were consigned to the galleys as slaves and that, at least for
27. See infra text accompanying notes 92-109.
28. 1 Edw. VI., c. 3 (1547), repealed by 3 & 4 Edw. VI, c. 16 (citing the "extremitie of some
[of such laws] have byn occation that they have not ben putt in [use]"). As Blackstone put it,
"the spirit of the nation could not brook this [a slave's] condition, even in the most abandoned
rogues .... " 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *412.
For a general discussion of the act, see C.S.L. Davies, Slavery and Protector Somerset: The Vagrancy Act of 1547, 19 EcoN. HIST. REV. 533 (2d ser. 1966).
29. 1 COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX: CALENDAR TO THE SESSIONS RECORDS: NEW SERIES,
1612-1614, at x, 400 (William Le Hardy ed., 1935) ("Two men in 1614 were sent to Bridewell to
be whipped, shaved, and kept at perpetual labour") (second emphasis added). The possibility of
perpetual coerced free labor is explored in Otto Kahn-Freund, Blackstone's Neglected Child: The
Contract of Employment, 93 L. Q. REv. 508, 516-18 (1977) (discussing Blackstone and
Bentham).
30. See, e.g., JOHN c. COBDEN, THE WHITE SLAVES OF ENGLAND 117-18, 203 (Irish Univ.
Press 1971) (2d ed. 1860); M. DOROTHY GEORGE, LONDON LIFE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 224-31 (1965); JOHN L. HAMMOND & BARBARA HAMMOND, THE TOWN LABORER 17601832, at 155-67 (1977); JOHN RULE, THE EXPERIENCE OF LABOUR IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
ENGLISH INDUSTRY 102 (1981); SLACK, supra note 14, at 39-40.
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those individuals, the law did not flinch from explicit slave status. 31
The rapid growth of indentured servitude and Indian and black
slavery in the colonies is, of course, even more damaging to the received picture of free labor. Colonial indentured servitude relied on
certain formal doctrines from the English law of apprenticeship and
servitude, but it was a radically different, and consistently more brutal,
institution as practiced in the New World. Indeed, plantation slavery
was wholly new to the common law. Granted, it is possible to differentiate metropolitan free labor from these colonial practices and to
argue that colonial labor innovations did not affect the general proposition that at home all men and labor were free. The common law
relied on this metropolitan-colonial distinction, and the courts of a
number of Continental powers did so as well. 32 But this distinction
was far from convincing, and servitude and slavery in the colonies coexisted uneasily with the notion that common law recognized only free
labor and free status with the exception of "villeinage." As a result,
the traditional proposition that all labor was free by the sixteenth century represents a circular legal description and an inadequate social
description.
II.

STEINFELD'$ REINTERPRETATION OF FREE
AND COERCED LABOR

Steinfeld responds to the traditional picture of free labor by
presenting a radically different model, consisting of three related arguments. First, most labor was governed by coercion - the legal obligation to work and finish one's work on pain of specific performance,
imprisonment, or other forms of legal compulsion. In that sense, labor
was unfree in practice until at least the eighteenth century, in both
England and its American colonies (chs. 2-4). Second, nobody conflated the coercion of labor with the slave status of plantation blacks
because the common law assumed that all (whites) were free and because the modem free-unfree dichotomy is itself an anachronism that
has little applicability until the late eighteenth century (pp. 10, 13, 5354, 99-104). Third, the replacement of the unfree labor paradigm with
the new "free labor" model was not an inevitable byproduct of eighteenth- or nineteenth-century capitalism, but rather resulted from ideological struggles in which republicanism, the American Revolution,
and the persistence of the increasingly odious institution of black slavery (pp. 137-46) impelled average American working men and women
to act (pp. 123-27, 181).
Behind this ambitious argument is Steinfeld's premise that early
31. See A.F. POLLARD, ENGLAND UNDER PROTECTOR SOMERSET 224 n.1 (1966); Davies,

supra note 28, at 548 n.3; J. H. Baker, The Roots of Modern Freedom: Personal Liberty Under
the Common Law, 1200-1600, at 20-21 (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
32. BLACKBURN, supra note 21, at 42.
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modem "freedom" is best understood as the interaction of labor regulations and social institutions, and not as the formal ascription of common law "free" status. Traditional legal historians would find this
first step to be strained and doctrinally wrong, since by its own terms
the common law defined free status not in terms of legal disabilities on
labor, but rather as the opposite of villeinage. Steinfeld's aim, however, is not to account for doctrine in its traditional common law pigeonholes, but to use doctrine to explain larger legal and social
structures. Having decoupled his inquiry from reliance on the law of
villeinage or the practices of manorial serfdom, Steinfeld proceeds to
assemble his case for the unfreedom of labor prior to the nineteenth
century. He emphasizes a careful parsing of the two principal regulatory statutes, the Statute of Laborers (1351) and the Statute of Artificers (1563), and an analysis of their enforcement (pp. 22-23, 28-30, 7778).
Through this point in his argument, Steinfeld's presentation is
original in two senses. First, his claim that the regulatory scheme was
not merely oppressive, but also defined a regime of coerced labor, goes
considerably further than the claims of previous progressive historians. 33 Second, he makes this argument by emphasizing certain littleremembered but critical provisions of the two major labor statutes.
Earlier studies of labor regulation have consistently focused on other
provisions of these statutes, chiefly those addressing wage-fixing and
mandatory apprenticeship, 34 perhaps because enforcement of these
provisions seemed most amenable to quantitative testing. In contrast,
Steinfeld stresses the general statutory requirements that various
classes of persons seek work and that anyone obligated to work complete his term or task on pain of imprisonment or forcible specific performance (pp. 22-24, 30-31, 36-37). He thereby succeeds in using
familiar evidence in a novel way, anchoring the statutes in the context
of unfreedom.
Steinfeld's general claim that labor and persons were meaningfully
"unfree" in terms of being subject to coercion (p. 102) is both original
and correct, but some of Steinfeld's legal arguments rely on evidence
that is more ambivalent in practice than he allows. Consider the Statute of Artificers (1563), a central element in his treatment of labor law
(pp. 23-24, 31-33, 38-40). Steinfeld should not be faulted for assembling a relatively small body of case law to support his contention that,
under the Statute's sections 2-6, local officials were able to force persons to enter or complete terms of service. As he notes, the incomplete state of local recordkeeping prior to the seventeenth century
33. See, e.g., MARC LINDER, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAW: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 51-55 (1989).
34. See, e.g., WAGE REGULATION IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND (W.E. Minchinton ed.,
1972) (including works by R.H. Tawney and R. Keith Kelsall, and citing other literature).
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partly explains the dearth of record entries, as does the fact that certain enforcement steps could be taken by one or two justices acting
informally. 35
But the Statute of Artificers' ideological support for a regime of
unfree labor is undermined by evidence that some masters denounced
the act and that other provisions of the statute were at times popular
with working people. Legislators and magistrates often opposed the
statute's apprenticeship provision as a cause of unemployment and
economic stagnation, 36 thus anticipating Adam Smith's later views. 37
Conversely, for at least some struggling journeymen, the statutory requirement that persons serve apprenticeships before entering certain
trades was protective rather than burdensome, since it prevented a
flood of newly admitted competitors leading to the impoverishment of
all. 38 Similarly, the wage-fixing provisions of the Statute have been
widely denounced by later scholars, both Left and Right. 39 Contemporaries, however, saw wage fixing differently. On some occasions paternalist Tudor-Stuart governments pressed local magistrates to raise
wages. 40 Well into the eighteenth century many working people
viewed statutory assessments not as coercive but benevolent, and they
sought new assessments to raise wages. 41
35. Pp. 29-30, 229 n.63; see also ROBERT B. SHOEMAKER, PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT:
PETIT CRIME AND THE LAW IN LoNDON AND RURAL MIDDLESEX, C. 1660-1725, at 38-39, 54,
83, 87, 174, 184-85 (1991). The legal authority of masters to beat their errant household employees frequently made resorting to formal sanctions unnecessary and also explains the lack of cases.
Pp. 32, 44-46.
36. See, e.g., Notes of the Lords' Committee on the Decay ofRents and Trade, 1669, reprinted
in SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY EcONOMIC DOCUMENTS 68, 70 (Joan Thirsk & J.P. Cooper eds.,
1972) (citing Mr. Childe, Nov. 4, 1669); see also T.S. AsHTON, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF
ENGLAND: THE 18TH CENTURY 224 (1955) (parliament opposes statute); EDMUND s. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 66,
68 (1975) (local justices and investors realize the statute's year-long service provision discourages
employment); JOHN u. NEF, INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT IN FRANCE AND ENGLAND 15401640, at 41, 47-48 (1940) (local magistrates not interested in enforcing law); E.P. THOMPSON,
THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS 274-75 (1963) (eighteenth-century judges dislike act).
37. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 225-26 (Andrew Skinner abr. ed., Pelican
Books 1970) (1776).
38. See, e.g., RULE, supra note 30, at 96; JOHN STEVENSON, POPULAR DISTURBANCES IN
ENGLAND 1700-1870, at 120 (1979); THOMPSON, supra note 36, at 253, 527.
39. For condemnation by free market economists, see, for example, SMITH, supra note 37, at
245. For arguments from prolabor economists, see E.H. PHELPS BROWN, THE ECONOMICS OF
LABOR 116, 118, 124, 203-04 (1962); LINDER, supra note 33, at 46, 51-55; see also WAGE REGULATION IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND, supra note 34, at 14 (citing condemnation by Thorold
Rogers).
40. See, e.g., CICELY HOWELL, LAND, FAMILY, AND INHERITANCE IN TRANSITION:
KIBWORTH HARCOURT 1280-1700, at 168 (1983); RICHARD H. TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE
RISE OF CAPITALISM 177 (1926); see also WAGE REGULATION IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND,
supra note 34, at 14 (citing W.A. Hewins' view that seventeenth-century assessments had the
effect of raising wages).
41. G.D.H. COLE & RAYMOND POSTGATE, THE COMMON PEOPLE 1746-1946, at 208 (4th
ed. 1949); JOHN L. & BARBARA HAMMOND, THE VILLAGE LABOURER, 1760-1832, at 133-44
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The more general problem with reading the Statute of Artificers to
imply a regime of coerced labor is that labor in the Tudor-Stuart period was notoriously unsettled. The geographic mobility of English
laborers, servants, youth, and the poor is well documented. 42 Admittedly, the Steinfeld model can tolerate high levels of geographic mobility, because coerced labor is consistent with laborers and servants
moving seasonally, annually, or at other intervals (pp. 27, 34), provided that at each new job the same statutory framework and premises
applied. But the high levels of geographic mobility might rather point
toward a regime in which labor discipline was challenged and labor
freedom asserted against Steinfeldian unfreedom. From this viewpoint, criminal sanctions and specific performance for labor contracts
existed chiefly on paper, and local magistrates devoted more energy to
moving the poor and underemployed to other parishes than to keeping
laborers in place. 43
In fact, much of the best social history of the past thirty years
describes people who did not lead orderly, settled lives regulated by
the work regimen of the Statute of Artificers.
Beneath the surface stability of rural England, then, the vast placid open
fields which catch the eye, was the seething mobility of forest squatters,
itinerant craftsmen and building labourers, unemployed men and women
seeking work, strolling players, minstrels and jugglers, pedlars and
quack doctors, gipsies, vagabonds, tramps: congregated especially in
London and the big cities, but also with footholds wherever newly-squatted areas escaped from the machinery of the parish or in old-squatted
areas where labour was in demand. 44
(1911); ROBERT W. MALCOLMSON, LIFE AND LABOUR IN ENGLAND 1700-1780, at 123 (1981);
EsTHER MOIR, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 99 (1969); RULE, supra note 30, at 161.
42. MALCOLMSON, supra note 41, at 71-74; MIGRATION AND SOCIETY IN EARLY MODERN
ENGLAND (Peter Clark & David Souden eds., 1987); Peter Clark, The Migrant in Kentish Towns
1580-1640, in CRISIS AND ORDER IN ENGLISH TOWNS 1500-1700, at 117 (Peter Clark & Paul
Slack eds., 1972); M.J. Kitch, Capital and Kingdom: Migration to Later Stuan London, in
LoNDON 1500-1700, at 224 (A.L. Beier & Roger Finlay eds., 1986); John Patten, Patterns of
Migration and Movement of Labour to Three Pre-Industrial East Anglian Towns, in PRE-INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND: GEOGRAPHICAL EssAYS 143 (John Patten ed., 1979); Paul Slack, Vagrants
and Vagrancy in England, 1598-1664, 27 EcoN. HIST. REV. 360 (2d ser. 1974); see PETER LASLETT, FAMILY LIFE AND ILLICIT LOVE IN EARLIER GENERATIONS: EsSAYS IN HISTORICAL
SOCIOLOGY 50 (1977) (presenting the argument that English villages saw high structural turnover of their populations).
43. "Probably most local authorities at any time showed more enthusiasm about harassing
vagrants than in more constructive efforts." J.P. Cooper, Social and Economic Policies Under
the Commonwealth, in THE INTERREGNUM: THE QUEST FOR SETTLEMENT 1646-1660, at 121,
128 (Gerald E. Aylmer ed., 1972), reprinted in J.P. COOPER, LAND, MEN AND BELIEFS: STUDIES IN EARLY-MODERN HISTORY 222, 229 (Gerald E. Aylmer & Johns. Morrill eds., 1983).
For types of selective enforcement of the labor laws, see CYNTHIA B. HERRUP, THE COMMON
PEACE: PARTICIPATION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND
161-62 (1987) (availability oflabor laws as additional sanction against poor and laboring defendants who had been acquitted by juries); SLACK, supra note 14, at 37-38 (provisions against labor
mobility rarely applied against arriving young males whose labor was needed).
44. CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN 48-49 (1975).
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We have learned to look for these "masterless men," in forest, heath,
and waste, on the roads and in markets, in coastal and wealden villages, in mining and weaving areas - in all the dark corners of the
land where men could "live out of sight or out of slavery";45 in alehouses everywhere;46 in open parishes; in urban sanctuaries where the
king's writ did not run; 47 and even in southeastern and midlands
champion-country villages with resident gentry.
This undisciplined quality of early modern labor was not merely
the consequence of administrative weakness and local recalcitrance.
On the contrary, it grew out of the structure of the premodern English
economy. Most persons, regardless of their legal or labor status (servants in husbandry, hired laborers, smallholders, craftsmen, the working poor) were sometimes unemployed and often underemployed. 48
Of necessity, they turned to second occupations,49 small gardens, petty
industrial production, a range of craft skills, and such undesirable activities - in the eyes of men of property - as keeping tippling
houses, so begging, and committing crimes. This need to develop other
sources of income was strongest in pastoral and woodland areas, but
dual employment and multiple occupations were characteristic responses everywhere to endemic underemployment in a subsistence
agrarian economy. Like geographic mobility, chronic underemployment and multiple employment undermined the statutory regimen of a
dependent, stable workforce working twelve hours (excluding breaks)
in summer and from dawn to nightfall in winter, under annual or sixmonth retainers, for masters who possessed quasi-feudal rights of jurisdiction over their employees.
However uncoerced English working life may have been in prac45. Id. at 46 (citing Gerard Winstanley).
46. ALAN EVERfIT, CHANGE IN THE PROVINCES: THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 41-42
(1972); Peter Clark, The Alehouse and the Alternative Society, in PURITANS AND REVOLUTIONARIES: EssAYS IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY HISTORY PRESENTED TO CHRISTOPHER HILL 47
(Donald Pennington & Keith Thomas eds., 1978) [hereinafter PURITANS AND REVOLUTIONARIES]; Clark, supra note 42, at 140-41.
47. 2 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN 339-46 (J. H. Baker ed., 94 Selden Socy. 1978);
James R. Hertzler, The Abuse and Outlawing of Sanctuary for Debt in Seventeenth-Century England, 14 HIST. J. 467 (1971).
48. AsHTON, supra note 36, at 203; MALCOLMSON, supra note 41, at 37-38; MORGAN, supra
note 36, at 63-67; D.C. Coleman, Labour in the English Economy of the Seventeenth Century, 8
EcoN. HIST. REV. 280, 289-91 (2d ser. 1956), reprinted in 2 EsSAYS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY,
supra note 11, at 291, 301-03.
49. P. 35; AsHTON, supra note 36, at 202-03; Alan Everitt, Farm Labourers, in 4 THE AGRA·
RIAN HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND WALES: 1500-1640, at 396, 425-29 (Joan Thirsk ed., 1967);
MALCOLMSON, supra note 41, at 38-46; RULE, supra note 30, at 12-16. The leading authority on
new agricultural and industrial alternatives is Dr. Joan Thirsk, some of whose relevant work is
found in JOAN THIRSK, EcoNOMIC POLICY AND PROJECTS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CONSUMER SOCIETY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND (1978), and in chapters 13, 15 and 16 of JOAN
THIRSK, THE RURAL EcONOMY OF ENGLAND (1984).
SO. Clark, supra note 46, at 47, 49, 52-53 (poor craftsmen and husbandmen keeping
alehouses).
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tice, such freedom does not undermine Steinfeld's position that a stable, coerced labor force was the legal ideal. "It is not uncommon for a
society to be torn between ideal and reality, and the people of early
seventeenth-century England experienced this tension to an unusual
degree." 51 For Steinfeld, the reality was that labor was coerced when
necessary. The significance of the statutory labor regime is thus the
availability of coercion rather than its consistent application. But it
also is likely that the government officials and men of property who
drafted and enforced the Tudor-Stuart scheme of labor regulation recognized the divergence between ideal and reality and knew that stable
labor was, at best, a dated medieval ideal that grew less practical with
each decade. 52 If so, rather than embodying, recapitulating, or reasserting a particular legal or social theory, Tudor-Stuart labor regulation may instead represent the government's short- and middle-term,
ameliorative efforts to respond to a series of perceived domestic socialwelfare crises.
Thus, Steinfeld reads the Statute of Artificers as an attempt to reassert and extend the notions of tied, coerced labor articulated in earlier
legislation, notions that local justices applied as needed for almost two
centuries and masters and employers accepted everywhere (pp. 63-64).
But other historians see the Statute as an attempt to respond to shortterm crises, particularly in the wool and textile industries. 53 They see
the Statute as part of larger, ongoing legislative programs to address
crime, poverty, vagrancy, squatting, unchecked urban expansion, unlicensed alehouses, price inflation, depression in the textile and other
industries, unemployment and underemployment, silted harbors, agricultural instability, rural depopulation and enclosure, failure to attend
church, ignorance about matters of faith, unsupervised preaching, misdirected charitable impulses among the gentry, and so on. 54 Many of
these programs, and much of the economic theory of the time, stressed
the need to put the poor to work. 55 But this impulse often did not take
51. DAVID UNDERDOWN, REVEL, RIOT, AND REBELLION: POPULAR POLITICS AND CULTURE IN ENGLAND 1603-1660, at 9 (1987).
52. See DYER, supra note 10, at 224 (suggesting that fifteenth-century labor regulation was
intended to have an effect, but that it was highly impractical and says more about ruling-class
social anxieties than about how labor was in fact regulated); see also Elaine Clark, Medieval
Labor Law and English Local Courts, 27 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 330, 346-47 (1983) (suggesting that
medieval labor law was applied with some flexibility).
53. WAGE REGULATION IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND, supra note 34, at 10-11, 16-17.
54. See, e.g., THOMAS G. BARNES, SOMERSET 1625-1640, at 172-202 (1961) (enforcement of
poor relief and related laws, including labor laws, temporarily intensified to comply with comprehensive Caroline Book of Orders); MOIR, supra note 41, at 37-46, 59-64 (poor laws and labor
oversight part of larger framework of social welfare legislation); SLACK, supra note 14, at 22-25
(reaching similar conclusions); TAWNEY, supra note 40, at 260 (making similar arguments).
55. JOYCE 0. APPLEBY, EcONOMIC THOUGHT AND IDEOLOGY IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY
ENGLAND 140-46 (1978); AsHTON, supra note 36, at 203; CHRISTOPHER HILL, SOCIETY AND
PURITANISM IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY ENGLAND 266-67 (1964); MORGAN, supra note 36, at 67,
320-25; SLACK, supra note 14, at 27, 39; Coleman, supra note 48, at 291-92, 298, 301-03.
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the form of enforcing the work regimen set out in the Statute of Artificers. Historians have argued about the mix of coercive, humanitarian,
and rhetorical impulses that infused the Statute and Tudor-Stuart legislation and enforcement generally. 56 But it is clear that in practice
the Statute of Artificers was not uniformly applied to coerce labor.
The political-administrative interpretations of other historians are not
incompatible with Steinfeld's longer-term ideological and analytical
claims, but they do suggest very different values and aims for the labor
regulation of the period.
Regardless of the strength of the evidence supporting Steinfeld's
claim that labor was significantly coerced or that legislators, judges,
and employers thought it could be coerced, his focus on coercion and
"unfreedom" is strikingly important. Legal freedom and unfreedom
were concepts at war with one another. There were three elements to
this seventeenth-century paradox. First, most workers in early modem England were formally under some legal compulsion, as Steinfeld
stresses (pp. 15-121, 243 n.36, 244 n.46). Second, the contrary notion
that all Englishmen were free was widespread and increasingly important - indeed, contemporaries saw freedom as a defining characteristic of English law and English identity (pp. 95-101). Yet, third,
English traders and settlers over the seventeenth century accommodated themselves to a labor regime of slavery - total unfreedom.
Steinfeld's discussion of how English labor practices were reconciled
with the growing ideology of English freedom is one of his finest (pp.
101-21). The reconciliation of the ideology of freedom with the new
practice of colonial slavery is a matter outside the scope of his book; it
is perhaps a more difficult issue, and one whose legacy is familiar and
tragic for Americans.
The ideological emphasis on the freedom of the English was central to the legal definition of early modem freedom. Granted, pride in
the freedom provided by common law was not new. All over medieval
Europe, the doctrine arose that town air made one free, and English
law applied a version of this. 57 Bracton, the great legal treatise of the
early to mid-thirteenth century, contains references to the law's "favour for freedom" in dubious cases involving status, 58 and such eminent later jurists as Fortescue adopted favor libertatis as a proof text of
the virtue of English law. But we now know that this medieval doctrine merely represented borrowed Roman learning, and that its value
to medieval theory lay in protecting free men from wrongful degrada56. SLACK, supra note 14, at 67-76 (including bibliography to the standard works); Valerie
Pearl, Puritans and Poor Relief: The London Workhouse, 1649-1660, in PURITANS AND REVO·
LUTIONARIES, supra note 46, at 206-11 (citing Leonard, Webbs, Tawney, Hampson, James, and
Jordan on the impulses behind poor relief and government policy).
57. 2 BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 36-37 (George E. Woodbine
ed. & Samuel E. Thome trans., 1968).
58. Id. at 300; 3 BRACTON, supra note 57, at 91, 109 (1977).
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tion to servitude, rather than in fostering freedom as such. 59
By contrast, the Tudor-Stuart talk of freedom and common law
rights was an important extension, in emphasis, volume, and consequences, of medieval rhetoric (pp. 95-101). "Rights-talk" and the perceived threat of enslavement were discussed in varied contexts. In
some contexts, the argument held that an oppressed English group
had already been "enslaved." 60 More often, the argument centered on
one or another enemy seeking to enslave the virtuous English, who
had managed to retain their birthright of freedom. Nor was this discussion of rights and freedom the exclusive domain of the political
elite or of constitutional theorists. Litigation involved even laborers
and husbandmen, and they too spoke the language of common law
rights and freedom. 61
Somehow contemporaries reconciled the widespread notion that
the English were free with the palpable fact that English men and women toiled in coercive labor. The traditional account of labor law,
however, simply distinguishes personal status from labor institutions,
thereby avoiding the question of how contemporaries accepted such
dissonant answers. Steinfeld's subtler and more convincing approach
frames an ideological model of freedom that rejects the dichotomy between free and unfree, borrowed from modem law. 62 Instead, his map
of early modem status ranges from free (men of property), to coerced
but free (all English labor), to rightless (aliens), to unfree (slaves, as
well as subjects of foreign despots) (pp. 99-104). The elegance of
Steinfeld's argument derives from his illustration that contemporaries
viewed laborers and servants simultaneously as free and coerced, but
that coercion did not imply that the laborer was unfree in the sense
that a slave was unfree (pp. 95-101). As Hobbes noted in a related
59. JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIE 103-05 (Stanley B. Chrimes ed. &
trans., 1942) (c. 1468-1471). Sir Edward Coke followed Fortescue's use of the doctrine. 1 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRsr PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND§ 193, at
*124b. The Roman origins, Bractonian formulation, and medieval uses of the doctrine are set
out in PAUL HYAMS, KINGS, LoRDS AND PEASANTS IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: THE COMMON
LAW OF VILLEINAGE IN THE TwELFTH AND THIRTEENTH CENTURIES 203-19 (1980). The
doctrine's later evolution is traced in Baker, supra note 31, at 11-12, 14, 17-18.
60. See, e.g., PURITANISM AND LIBERTY 61 (A.S.P. Woodhouse ed., 1992) (Oct. 29, 1647
comment of Col. Rainsborough in Putney Debates that "the old law of England ... enslaves the
people of England ...."); SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY EcONOMIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 36, at
183-84 (citing Richard Baxter's 1691 view of "the poor enslaved husbandmen ... for none are so
servilely dependent (save household servants and ambitious expectants) as they are on their landlords"); TAWNEY, supra note 40, at 254 (citing Gerard Winstanley's complaint that, despite
victory over the king, "we ... remayne slaves still to the kingly power in the hands of lords of
manors").
61. James Sharpe, The People and the Law, in POPULAR CULTURE IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY 244, 245 (Barry Reay ed., 1985).
62. Not that the dichotomy is exclusively a modem formulation. It is found, for instance, in
JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES I.3 and in 2 BRACTON, supra note 57, at 29. Steinfeld's premise is that,
unlike their nineteenth-century analogues, the earlier formulations in fact created hybrid statuses
of persons free but subject to coercion.
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context, "Feare and Liberty are consistent ...." 63
This redefinition of the spectrum of freedom has considerable significance, both for Steinfeld's argument about free labor and for an
understanding of the first steps the English colonies took toward
adopting slave labor. By viewing early modem labor as free, that is,
by taking its rhetorical claims seriously, we can understand the potency of the common law, even to the poor, and the availability of that
common law as a resource that might occasionally support their
claims against men of property. 64 By viewing early modem freedom
as compatible with coercion, we can make sense of long-abandoned
doctrines such as specific performance and criminal sanctions for
breach of labor contracts. Labor coercion as a part of early modem
freedom also helps explain the consistent use of assigned labor service,
bridewells, and parish apprenticeships in England's unique, nationwide poor relief scheme. Finally, by appreciating the existence of coercion in English notions of freedom, we can begin to understand how
the common law accepted racial slavery in the English colonies and,
arguably, in England for a while. 65 By virtue of its contribution to the
intellectual and legal underpinnings of the move to slavery in the common law world, this redefinition of the spectrum of early modem legal
status is among the most important contributions of Steinfeld's book. 66
Ill.

STEINFELD'S ARGUMENT FOR THE INVENTION
OF FREE LABOR

The other part of Steinfeld's argument explains how the early modem paradigm of coerced labor yielded to the modem notion of free
labor over the course of the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. At this point, his emphasis switches to colonial America and
American evidence. He contends that early English settlers borrowed
their notions of labor from English law, so that all (white) seventeenth-century laborers in the colonies worked under the same regime
of practical unfreedom as in England. But by the early eighteenth century hired laborers and craftsmen in the colonies were accepted as free
and mobile; the law ceased to enforce specific performance or criminal
sanctions against their failure to find or complete work (pp. 50-51,
112-13, 121, 230 n.72). Only servants and apprentices remained sub63. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 262 (Crawford B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1968)
(1651).
64. John Brewer and John Styles, Introduction, AN UNGOVERNABLE PEOPLE: THE ENGLISH AND THEIR LAW IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 11, 14-20 (John
Brewer & John Styles eds., 1980); Douglas Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in
ALBION'S FATAL TREE 17, 39 (Douglas Hay et al. eds., 1975).
65. SEYMOUR DRESCHER, CAPITALISM AND ANTISLAVERY 35 (1987).
66. For the leading interpretations, see, for example, DAVIS, supra note 21; WINTHROP D.
JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812
(1968).
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ject to coercion. Steinfeld completes his argument by explaining how,
as part of a contentious and politicized process in the nineteenth century, certain labor institutions came to be seen as unfree and therefore
illegitimate.
Why legal coercion was already deemed inappropriate for laborers
and craftsmen by the eighteenth century, however, is a difficult question, and a definitive answer may come from social and economic
rather than legal history. Perhaps the new freedom related to the relative availability of land. With a declining birthrate and rising real
wages in late seventeenth-century England, opportunities were less
bleak at home, and it grew harder to entice prospective migrants to the
colonies. 67 Moreover, there was little incentive for colonial laborers,
especially freedmen, to remain under a coercive labor regime, with
land already taken or exhausted in the areas of old colonial settlement
in the Tidewater and a growing native-born population. 68 New land
was suddenly available because the frontier pushed into Indian lands
in the early eighteenth century. Under such circumstances, it would
have been difficult to keep laborers by relying principally on the stick
of legal coercion. The materialist explanation, however, raises as
many questions as it answers. For instance, it may be that eighteenthcentury America paradoxically was characterized not by abundant
land, but rather by overcrowding and diminished opportunity. 69 If so,
masters relaxed their disciplinary rights because they had marketbased alternatives to legal coercion. On the other hand, accepting the
traditional view that land and opportunity were abundant, we describe
circumstances that, in other cultures, have led to intensified labor
discipline. 70
A better explanation for the new freedom of colonial wage laborers
67. ALLAN KULIKOFF, THE AGRARIAN ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 190 (1992);
Russell R. Menard, British Migration to the Chesapeake Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, in
COLONIAL CHESAPEAKE SOCIETY 99, 108-11 (Lois G. Carr et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter
Menard, British Migration]; Russell R. Menard, From Servants to Slaves: The Transformation of
the Chesapeake Labor System, 16 S. STUD. 355, 374-80 (1977) [hereinafter Menard, Servants to
Slaves]; see also DAVID HARRIS SACKS, THE WIDENING GATE: BRISTOL AND THE ATLANTIC
EcoNOMY, 1450-1700, at 282-302 (1991) (suggesting that a decline in religious persecution eased
pressure on English servants to emigrate).
68. ALLAN KULIKOFF, TOBACCO AND SLAVES: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHERN CULTURES IN THE CHESAPEAKE, 1680-1800, at 36-42 (1986); Lois G. Carr & Russell R. Menard,
Immigration and Opportunity: The Freedman in Early Colonial Maryland, in THE CHESAPEAKE
IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 206, 224 (Thaddeus w. Tate & David Ammerman eds., 1979);
Menard, British Migration, supra note 67, at 111-12; Russell R. Menard, From Servant to Freeholder: Status Mobility and Property Accumulation in Seventeenth-Century Maryland, 30 WM. &
MARY Q. 37 (3d ser. 1973); Lorena S. Walsh, Servitude and Opportunity in Charles County,
Maryland, 1658-1705, in LAW, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS IN EARLY MARYLAND 111 (Aubrey c.
Land et al. eds., 1977).
69. Kenneth Lockridge, Land, Population and the Evolution of New England Society 16301790, PAST & PRESENT, Apr. 1968, at 62.
70. See Robert Brenner, Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe, PAST & PRESENT, Feb. 1976, at 30, 38-41, reprinted in THE BRENNER DEBATE 10,
20-23 (T.H. Aston & C.H.E. Philpin eds., 1985); Domar, supra note 8; see also Menard, Servants
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relates it to the spread of slave labor, which exploded in numerical
importance, especially in the southern colonies. 71 Suddenly, restraining white laborers and craftsmen was less important for masters
because they had slaves as an alternative workforce. It was also
harder to coerce white laborers because the ideological foundations of
slavery became exclusively racial; by definition white labor was free,
though the precise definition of freedom had yet to be developed. But
under any view, the result of the new freedom of laborers and
craftsmen was that only servants and apprentices were still unfree in
the traditional sense (pp. 121, 130-33, 159-60).
Meanwhile, the legal theory justifying the practical unfreedom of
servants and apprentices continued to be based on a combination of
traditional property and jurisdictional notions. Steinfeld devotes considerable effort to showing that both common law (pp. 55-87) and
early American law (pp. 55-57, 87-91) deemed coercion to be permissible because employers had both a leaselike property interest in the
labor of their employees and jurisdictional rights to govern of those
who labored under them.
Steinfeld's two alleged rationales for labor coercion - property
and jurisdiction - did not entirely persuade me. His emphasis on the
writ of covenant as a basis for the proprietary view of human labor
distinguishes too sharply between covenant and other real actions on
the basis of the alleged passing of property (pp. 28, 73-74, 157), and it
slights the fact that employers increasingly used personal actions of
the trespass and case families. 72 The intriguing claim that late medieval labor was a community resource characterizes a few, isolated cases
(pp. 5, 61, 63), but the typical suit against fugitive laborers alleged that
they had abandoned obligations to particular employers, not to the
manorial community. Steinfeld's effort to classify labor as a leaselike
interest is suggestive, particularly in explaining the terminology of
standard-form eighteenth-century indentures, 73 but it is far from conclusive. Similarly, the use of "wardship" in the sixteenth century does
not, despite Steinfeld's claims (pp. 69, 72), prove that the common law
conceived of property interests in persons, but rather was one of many
examples of "fiscal feudalism" by which the Tudor-Stuart Crown
sought to extract new taxes and levies based on serviceable ancient
to Slaves, supra note 67, at 356-58, 388 (speculating whether the free land thesis explains American servitude).
71. KULIKOFF, supra note 68, at 40, 45, 64-66, 320; MORGAN, supra note 36, at 299-309.
72. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 360-80 (3d ed. 1990);
Gareth H. Jones, Per Quod Servitium Amisit, 74 L.Q. REV. 39, 45-53 (1958). For modern echoes
of this proprietarial approach, see I.R.C. v. Hambrook, [1956] 2 Q.B. 641, 660-66 (C.A.) (Den·
ning, L.J.); Jones Bros. (Hunstanton) Ltd. v. Stevens, [1955] 1 Q.B. 275, 282 (C.A.).
73. Pp. 75-76, 81-87, 156-57; see also Carr & Menard, supra note 68, at 229 (reference to
residential freedmen as "belonging to" their former masters).
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legal doctrines. 74
As for Steinfeld's jurisdictional rationale, patriarchal jurisdiction
was clearly in decline, as shown by its failure to account for the masterless men of the Tudor social landscape, but patriarchy revived in a
variety of contexts well after 1750. Early captains of industry, such as
Ambrose Crowley and Josiah Wedgwood, sought to impose labor regulatory schemes that rested exclusively on the rights of governance
appurtenant to a head of household, 75 and jurisdiction and household
governance were critical elements in the nineteenth-century support
for slavery. Accordingly, patriarchal jurisdiction was a consistent, but
very nuanced, theme in legal thought. Steinfeld insufficiently develops
its relationship to the changing discourse about labor.
These are small points, however. Steinfeld is utterly persuasive
about the compatibility of the property rationale with the capitalist
ethos of the eighteenth century. He rightly begins by stressing enclosure, by which laborers lost common lands and rights. 76 At the level
of high theory, the counterpart to this carving up of the remaining
commons was the new "possessive individualism." One might expect
that individualism, which acknowledged the juridically equal property
and contract rights of all persons, would imply an ideology of "free
labor" similar to that of the nineteenth century (pp. 105-06). But
eighteenth-century individualists did not blush at continuing to coerce
labor from their servants, apprentices, and slaves. Paradoxically, it
may have been easier for individualists to accept slavery. Since blacks
entered the English world from abroad, racism and xenophobia allowed theorists simply to ignore claims of humanity. As for legal considerations, the Romanesque doctrine of enslavement by captivity,
which long occupied a wholly ornamental place in English law, 77
seemed sufficient to justify plantation slavery - even after most slaves
were born within the colonies. But the coercion of servants was
harder to explain in an age of possessive individualism: servants were
not outsiders but English, and they and their labor ought to have been
fully free.
Steinfeld's contribution to intellectual history deepens with his explanation of how coercion of formally free labor was consistent with
the new capitalist ethos. Possessive individualism held only that each
person had a property interest in his own labor; nothing constrained
74. Joel Hurstfield, The Profits of Fiscal Feudalism, 1541-1602, 8 EcoN. HIST. REV. 53 (2d
ser. 1955).
75. AsHTON, supra note 36, at 212.
76. See pp. 34-35; 1 JOHN H. CLAPHAM, AN EcONOMIC HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN
114-27 (2d ed. 1930); MALCOMSON, supra note 41, at 23-27, 32-34..
77. 2 BRACTON, supra note 57, at 30-31; see Guyora Binder, Masters, Slaves, and Emancipation, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1435, 1441 (1989) (discussing what he terms "the cowardly
contract").
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the right of an individual to give, sell, or lease his own labor. 78 Steinfeld shows that theorists of possessive individualism could justify the
alienation of one person's labor to another in institutional forms that
entailed coercion precisely because labor had long been legally regulated by analogy to property interests. 79 Accordingly, individualists
could conclude that an apprentice or servant was fully free. By entering service, he voluntarily alienated, as any property owner could, the
commodity within his ownership - his labor. 80 Steinfeld nicely fills
out the possessive individualist thesis by explaining the older legal arguments available to eighteenth-century individualists. His argument,
moreover, is consistent with the emergence of the individualist justification of plantation slavery. In De Jure Naturae et Gentium,
Pufendorf conceded the weakness of the familiar "capture in just war"
doctrine and instead revived the more obscure doctrine that "self-sale"
legitimated slavery. 81
Steinfeld next shows how the map of free and unfree labor fell
short of the modern, dichotomous picture of free and slave as late as
the American Revolution and after. Landowners and wage workers
were free, blacks slaves were not free, and servants and apprentices
remained in between - free but subject to considerable legal disabilities and coercion. Somehow, however, in the fifty years after the
Revolution, indentured servitude and apprenticeship came to be perceived as forms of slavery. Upon losing their institutional legitimacy,
78. See generally C.B. MACPHERSON, THE PoLmCAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDU·
ALISM 214-20 (1962). But see KEITH TRIBE, LAND, LABOUR AND EcONOMIC DISCOURSE 50,
51 (1978) (criticizing possessive individualism for failing to distinguish between sale of labor and
sale of the capacity to labor, and thus for failing to distinguish the servant from the slave).
The famous examples of whether suicide or self-sale into slavery was permissible, on the
grounds that they represented alienation or disposal of the property interest in oneself, illustrate
the outer bounds of possessive individualism. Theorists rejected both options. As for slavery,
theorists wondered what infinitely large consideration could suffice for such sale - especially
since the money received for one's freedom would inevitably revert to the payor in his capacity as
slaveowner. Pp. 100-01. As for suicide, natural law arguments about the sacredness of life were
invoked to forbid it, thus rescuing individualism from its own logic. JOHN DUNN, THE POLIT·
!CAL THEORY OF JOHN LoCKE 88-89, 125 (1969); MACPHERSON, supra, at 220.
79. Pp. 5-6, 90-91, 105-11. Consistent with this, the individualist theorists often built their
arguments around property metaphors. DUNN, supra note 78, at 255.
80. Pp. 79. 99-101. For examples of the market in indentured labor, see, for example, DAVID

w. GALENSON, WHITE SERVITUDE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 102-13 (1981) (indentured servants
enter labor market voluntarily; terms and length of service vary with their skills, gender, and
destination); Menard, Servants to Slaves, supra note 67, at 107-08 (indentured servants bargain
for different lengths of service and destinations). But see Farley Grubb, The Market for Indentured Immigrants: Evidence on the Efficiency of Forward-Labor Contracting in Philadelphia,
1745-1773, 45 J. EcoN. HIST. 855 (1985) (arguing against the sensitivity of labor markets in the
eighteenth century). For the operation of an efficient labor market for nonindentured wage la·
bor, see pp. 108-11, as well as Carr & Menard, supra note 68, at 212-14 (varying terms for
freedmen's labor and sharecropping contracts).
81. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM 935-36 (C.H. & W.A.
Oldfather trans., 1934) (1688). For the wide availability of Pufendorf in the colonies, see WIL·
LIAM H. BRYSON, CENSUS OF LAW BOOKS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA xviii, 29 (1978).
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they were quickly and quietly abolished in the first third of the nineteenth century.
Steinfeld concludes his argument with the little-known story of the
antebellum emancipation of compelled free labor (pp. 147-72). He attributes this legal emancipation - and it was almost exclusively legal,
because the number of apprentices and indentured servants had already declined sharply - to the ideology and behavior of early nineteenth-century working people. Drawing on the scholarship
concerning early nineteenth-century urban craftsmen and American
class formation generally, a body of work to which he has already
contributed, 82 Steinfeld shows that working people absorbed some of
the radical, antihierarchical ideas of the Revolution and deployed
these ideas to challenge indentured servitude (pp. 123-27). The crux
of Steinfeld's argument is that indentures and apprenticeships disappeared because of ideological rejection, not because the market for
them changed significantly. Indentured servants continued to be
brought to the middle colonies, with interruptions only for the
Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, and masters continued to
purchase them, even in states where slavery was unpopular or prohibited (pp. 11-13, 164-65). Steinfeld reconciles antislavery sentiment
with the increasing repudiation of indentured servitude by unpacking
a number of fascinating encounters between employers, supported by
legal precedent, and republican journeymen, sometimes backed by
lawyers and merchants (pp. 164-77). A form of trickle-up emancipation resulted, and by the 1820s legal authorities began to reject the
ancient forms of coerced labor.
What are we to make of this engrossing narrative? Once again,
there are a few unanswered questions. Indentured servants continued
to be imported, as Steinfeld says, but the composition of the servant
pool changed over the eighteenth century. Increasingly, arriving servants were skilled craftsmen, German families, or convicted English
felons. 83 Steinfeld acknowledges this (pp. 89, 226 n.20), but he does
not address whether and how the identity of the servants affected legal
formulations of their status. For instance, did the fact that German
families typically arrived under a different legal form of indenture84
color the views of either the courts or the ideologically engaged urban
workers? Given the nativist strand in early nineteenth-century cul82. Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 335 (1989); see Gary J. Komblith, The Artisanal Response to Capitalist Transformation, 10
J. EARLY REPUBLIC 315 (1990) (surveying the literature).
83. A. ROGER EKIRCH, BOUND FOR AMERICA: THE TRANSPORTATION OF BRITISH CONVICTS TO THE COLONIES, 1718-1775 (1987); SHARON V. SALINGER, "To SERVE WELL AND
FAITHFULLY": LABOR AND INDENTURED SERVANTS IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1682-1800 (1987);
David W. Galenson, The Rise and Fall of Indentured Servitude in the Americas: An Economic
Analysis, 44 J. EcoN. HIST. 1, 12-13 (1984).
84. Pp. 164, 198 n.6; KULIKOFF, supra note 67, at 193.
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ture, did the German arrivals face initial indifference to their status,
and did these immigrants articulate their own notions of freedom? 85
In view of the importance of the rural nexus of American capitalism to
recent scholarship, was there opposition to indentured servitude from
farmers as well as urban craftsmen, and, if not, why did rural republicanism develop differently from its urban variant? 86
These mere quibbles, however, did not prevent this reader's enjoyment of Steinfeld's original, vigorously argued position. Refreshingly,
the book does not end on a note of triumphant whiggery. Steinfeld
stresses the centrality of the judicial repudiation of slavery-related
cases, such as Mary Clark, in which indentures had been forced on
freed slaves. 87 He steers clear of an encomium to the rejection of coerced free labor, instead devoting his last substantive discussion to
midcentury peonage. Not surprisingly, such institutions as Chinese
coolie labor and Indian peonage in the territories conquered from
Mexico were only hesitantly abolished. 88 Steinfeld's brief survey of
the latter in particular is a reminder of the racial and ethnic context in
which freedom was inscribed. It offers an appropriately ambiguous
note on which to end the history of a legal ideology of unfreedom.
IV.

STEINFELD AS CRITICAL LEGAL HISTORIAN OF FREE LABOR

Twenty-five years ago The Invention ofFree Labor would not have
been written; sixty to one hundred years ago, many comparable books
were written. The turn-of-the-century scholarship differed in many
ways from Steinfeld's work, most importantly in that it sought to address labor relations and poverty through legal evidence rather than to
address legal ideas directly. Given the extraordinary archival wealth
of English law, the social and economic historians necessarily turned
to legal evidence, and their efforts resulted in a body of distinguished
scholarship on the legal history of labor and poor laws. 89
For the better part of this century, however, labor historians
spurned legal evidence as crude or, at best, only a starting point. Historians learned to go beyond the statutes, cases, and legal handbooks
that, along with literary evidence, had formed the trellis for Fabian
85. Steven J. Ross, The Transformation ofRepublican Ideology, 10 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 323,
330 (1990).
86. See generally KULIKOFF, supra note 67.
87. Pp. 177-79; see also PAUL A. FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION 88, 92, 96 (1981);
Paul Finkelman, Evading the Ordinance: The Persistence ofBondage in Indiana and Illinois, 9 J.
EARLY REPUBLIC 21, 35-48 (1989).
88. Pp. 179-84; Galenson, supra note 83, at 15-24.
89. CLAPHAM, supra note 76; HAMMOND & HAMMOND, supra note 41; MARGARET JAMES,
SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND POLICY DURING THE PURITAN REVOLUTION 1640-1660 (2d ed. 1965);
E.M. LEONARD, THE EARLY HISTORY OF ENGLISH POOR RELIEF (1900); SIDNEY WEBB &
BEATRICE WEBB, ENGLISH LoCAL GOVERNMENT: ENGLISH POOR LAW HISTORY: PART I,
THE OLD POOR LAW (1927).
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labor histories. Later historians turned to new evidence, ranging from
parish registers to handbills and other accounts that captured humble
Englishmen in their own words. Historians learned the tools of other,
related disciplines, ranging from demography and development economics to cultural anthropology and feminist theory. With new evidence and tools, there seemed no need to base the history of work and
working people on legal records, legal institutions, and gentry perceptions. For two generations, scholars offered fine reconstructions of labor and the world of those who labored but little on how the law
conceived of labor.
Steinfeld's book is important in part because of its renewed attention to specifically legal issues. Steinfeld views labor law not for its use
as social evidence, and not as a set of doctrines that are interesting for
their own sake, but rather as the embodiment of competing social and
ideological ideas shaping beliefs and actions. From this perspective,
Steinfeld is able to examine five centuries of labor law and to make
meaningful generalizations about it. Steinfeld's aims and perspective
identify his work as part of the critical legal studies (CLS) tradition,
and this book represents a leading contribution to the growing body of
ambitious CLS legal histories.9°
As CLS history, the book comes with a few signature features.
Most obvious is the vocabulary. Like many CLS authors, Steinfeld
writes of "appropriating" concepts and doctrines (pp. 90, 94, 169); the
law in action is termed "experiential" (pp. 101, 160); ideas are "operationalized" (pp. 5, 94, 160, 163, 170); notions and legal formulations
mediate the "contradictory" (pp. 94, 137, 160, 186-87) pressures and
deep "tensions" (pp. 105, 131); answers are "contingent" (p. 160); and
the "play of interest" leads to any final result (pp. 155, 171). But beyond its terminological influence, Steinfeld's legal history includes two
valuable CLS themes. First, in his narrative, legal formulations are
contingent, provisional, and contested. Second, Steinfeld focuses on
the changing contours of notions like "free labor" as a fundamentally
American story, in which American workers and, secondarily, courts
were the critical agents of legal change. I will consider the implications of each claim.
To some, contingency is no longer a theme, but a historiographic
cliche. To others, the notion of freedom being contingent or contradictory seems itself unclear. After all, to adherents of Whiggish history, there is little contingent or contradictory about the unfreedom of
the medieval serf, the American plantation slave, or the Czech or
90. Along with Steinfeld, a leading CLS labor historian is William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 767. Many of the
best known historical CLS works are cited in Daniel R. Ernst, The Critical Tradition in the
Writing ofAmerican Legal History, 102 YALE L.J. 1019, 1031 n.73 (1993) (reviewing MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY (1992)).
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Hungarian living under the Stalinist boot. But Steinfeld's examination
of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century labor coercion is a fine case
study for the argument that freedom and servitude are not inevitable
or unchanging, and that they are not dependent on particular economic stages or institutions - in short, that freedom is contingent.
Freedom is a socially constructed, ascribed category, and its legal formulation is the result of mediation by different actors and interests.
This argument will be familiar to devotees of CLS history and unconvincing to many of its critics. What I found most persuasive about
Steinfeld's reconstruction of freedom and unfreedom is how well it fits
with another, controversial area of legal history that few CLS have
addressed: medieval freedom. 91 A brief outline of English medieval
legal status serves to underscore the extent to which Steinfeld's description of freedom as a disputed, multiplicitous, and shifting notion
can enrich the analysis of an earlier period.
At the time of Domesday Book (1086), there were a few slaves
(servi); nationally, the figure was approximately ten percent. 92 A variety of occupational and regional classifications served to label peasants, but most were free in that they were full members of a village
community - the opposite of a slave. At the same time, however,
"the [Domesday] villanus both is and is not a free man," 93 for the term
"free man" also appeared in contemporary records to indicate a person entitled, unlike most villani, to direct access to public institutions,
most notably the courts of shire and hundred. Other, local status
compilations also portrayed an agrarian world with numerous status
classes of dependent persons that ranged from fully free men to chattel
slaves. 94
Over the course of the twelfth century, this broad middle range of
status classes was squeezed until the legal writers saw a world of only
free and serf. A series of local processes that left no single "smoking
gun" seems to have emancipated Domesday's slaves while degrading
the larger class of "free" peasants. 95 By the early thirteenth century,
91. But see Guyora Binder, Angels and Infidels: Hierarchy and Historicism in Mediel'a/
Legal History, 35 BUFF. L. REv. 527 (1986).
92. HALLAM, supra note 7, at 22; H.B. Clarke, Domesday Slavery (Adjusted for Slaves}, 1
MIDLAND HIST., 37, 39-42 (1972) (reviewing THE DOMESDAY GEOGRAPHY OF MIDLAND ENG·
LAND (H.C. Darby & l.B. Terrett eds., 2d ed. 1971)).
93. FREDERIC w. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY BOOK AND BEYOND 43 (1966); see also Hatcher,
supra note 6, at 28; Rodney H. Hilton, Freedom and Villeinage in England, PAST & PRESENT,
July 1965, at 3, 4-5, reprinted in PEASANTS, KNIGHTS AND HERETICS 174, 175-76 (R.H. Hilton
ed., 1976).
94. See, e.g., ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS: 1042-1189, at 813-33 (David c. Douglas
& George W. Greenaway eds., 1953) (agrarian and manorial surveys); MAITLAND, supra note
93, at 36-46, 327-32; P.D.A. Harvey, Rectitudines Singularum Personarum and Gere/a, 108
ENG. HIST. REV. l (1993); David A.E. Pelteret, Two Old English Lists of Serft, 48 MEDIEVAL
STUD. 470, 474-75 (1986).
95. MAITLAND, supra note 93, at 35; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 5, at 430-31;
TITOW, supra note 11, at 57. Hatcher has recently challenged whether this meant any change in

May 1993]

The Rise of Free Labor

1407

the new common law defined freedom to exclude perhaps most of the
peasantry. 96 Vil/anus no longer referred to the ordinary villager, as it
had in Domesday, but to the unfree villager or common law villein,
while servus implied the serf or villein rather than Domesday's chattel
slave. Meanwhile, local histories show that the meaningful distinction
in reality may not have been between free and unfree peasants, but
rather between peasants, free or not, with guaranteed access to land on
favorable customary terms and the growing class of legally free landless laborers and cottagers. 97 But whatever the advantages of manorial membership, even on unfree terms, we also know that peasants
resisted and occasionally purchased their way out of unfree personal
status and its stigma. 98
Moreover, the overlap between personal status and land tenure,
and the new jurisdictional definitions imposed by the common law
complicated the map of legal freedom. 99 By the mid-thirteenth century, the new common law system defined unfreedom or villeinage
largely as the denial of access to the common law courts. It was circular for judges to say "a man is free if he can come into royal court and
can come into court if he is free," but the judges had no other choice.
Every other legal test of freedom - liability to various kinds of feudal
dues or work obligations, biological descent, common repute proved inadequate to describe the range of tenurial and status relations
in the thousands of English manors.
Serfage was the paradigm of unfreedom, but full access to the common law was denied to other groups as well, including foreign
merchants, forest dwellers, inhabitants of certain franchisal lordships,
the conquered Irish, and the Jews. Each of these groups experienced
the shared disability of alternative courts and law - the serf his manorial lord, the Irishman his feudal lord and the local Irish chancery
and parliament, the townsman his chartered borough court, the foreign merchant his chartered liberties, the monk his Ordinary and the
church courts, the Jew his religious court (beth din) and the royal Expractice for the villani. Hatcher, supra note 6, at 29-32; see also EDWARD MILLER & JOHN
HATCHER, MEDIEVAL ENGLAND - RURAL SOCIETY AND EcONOMIC CHANGE 1086-1348, at
126 (1978).
96. The timing and causation of this shift is explored in HYAMS, supra note 59, at 221-65;
Hilton, supra note 93, at 174.
97. HARVEY, supra note 10, at 120; MILLER, supra note 5, at 152-53 (consolidation of free
and unfree manorial tenantry into single peasant class). In the land-hungry years of the later
thirteenth century, to be an unfree person holding land on favorable customary terms was often
economically preferable to the poverty of the free, landless cottager. HOMANS, supra note 11, at
244, 248; Hatcher, supra note 6, at 16-24.
98. See supra notes 11, 26. For serfs purchasing freedom, see MILLER, supra note 5, at 142.
But see POSTAN, Legal Status, supra note 11, at 283-84 (medieval court rolls and charters indicate freedom less valuable than land); Hatcher, supra note 6, at 25 (few villeins purchase manumission, indicating that free personal status was deemed of little value).
99. MILLER & HATCHER, supra note 95, at 112-13, 118, 127; MILLER, supra note 5, at 129,
142; Trrow, supra note 11, at 55-61.
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chequer of the Jews. No one considered any of these persons a servus
in the sense of a tied agricultural laborer, though contemporaries occasionally employed the vocabulary of servitude. 100
In this emerging common law framework, legal vulnerability and
exclusion, rather than labor coercion as such, were the hallmarks of
unfreedom, even for serfs. In time, certain rights of alien merchants
were recognized in the Magna Carta and elsewhere, but such protection was of little practical import as their legal privileges fluctuated
with royal need.101 As for the Jews, the repeated confiscatory taxes of
the thirteenth century and their eventual expulsion from England in
1290 illustrate the price of legal exclusion. Lacking the protection of
custom, the excluded groups were among the few royal resources taxable without limit at a time when other, "free" groups succeeded in
imposing limits on the reach of Angevin government. 102 Jurisdiction
and legal protection served as the basis of the new definition of freedom, and outsiders were meaningfully unfree.
One hundred years earlier, however, freedom meant not access to
the common law - of which there was none yet - but having one's
own law. 103 Almost everybody had the privilege of a special legal
"deal." This was the essence of the early medieval and Carolingian
notions of freedom and fairly describes English notions until the late
twelfth century. The foreign merchants, townsmen, and Jews secured
charters of protection guaranteeing the right to inherit at customary
reliefs, assess and collect their own taxes, be exempt from judicial visitations, have their fellows on juries when they were sued, select their
own leaders, and be governed generally by their own customary rules.
Being outsiders to a nascent royal legal system meant little hardship.
If an outsider needed to opt into royal law, he might do that too - the
earliest Pipe Rolls document suitors buying the discretionary boon of
royal justice. 104
100. See Jonathan A. Bush, The Invisible Man: The Jew in Medieval English Law (1992)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Robert C. Stacey, 13th Century Anglo-Jewry and
the Problem of the Expulsion 5-6 (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). But see
Gavin I. Langmuir, "Tanquam Servi": The Change in Jewish Status in French Law About 1200,
in LES JUIFS DANS L'HISTOIRE DE FRANCE 25 (Myriam Yardeni ed., 1980), reprinted in TOWARD A DEFINITION OF ANTISEMITISM 167 (1990).
101. MAGNA CARTA, 41 (1215), reprinted in SELECT CHARTERS 297-98 (H.W.C. Davis ed.,
Oxford: The Clarendon Press 9th ed. 1913) (William Stubbs ed., 1870), and in 1 SOURCES IN
ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY § 41, at 115, 121 (Carl Stephenson & Frederick G.
Marcham eds. & trans., 1937); TERRENCE H. LLOYD, ALIEN MERCHANTS IN ENGLAND IN THE
HIGH MIDDLE AGES 9-34 (1982); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 5, at 458-67.
102. J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA AND MEDIEVAL GOVERNMENT 156, 171 (1985). Recall,
however, Aquinas' view that kings should not tax the nonusurious assets of their Jews beyond
customary levels. Thomas Aquinas, De Regimine Judaeorum, in AQUINAS: SELECTED POLIT·
ICAL WRITINGS 84 (A.P. D'Entreves ed. & John G. Dawson trans., 1970).
103. For this discussion, I am indebted to Stacey, supra note 100, at 8-11; see also Hilton,
supra note 93, at 176.
104. R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, ROYAL WRITS IN ENGLAND FROM THE CONQUEST TO
GLANVILL 228 n.7, 254-55 (1959); Pipe Roll of Henry l in 1 SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITU·
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By the mid-thirteenth century, however, to be kept outside the expanding common law - still to be unfree - was to be isolated and
vulnerable rather than privileged. Milsom has written of "a transformation of elementary legal ideas" 105 with respect to property in the
late twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and the same processes created
new notions of law, royal power, and freedom in England, and perhaps elsewhere. 106 "Like serfs, Jews were one of the groups in the
kingdom which failed to make the transition in the late 12th century
from a basically Carolingian legal world of liberties to an essentially
modern legal world which regarded liberty as a matter of civil rights
guaranteed by a common law."101
In short, the medieval concept of freedom was Steinfeldian. Notions of freedom changed, and different authorities had distinct understandings of freedom. Persons could be free in one setting and unfree
in another. Persons disputed the status ascribed to them and adhered
to earlier normative understandings of their legal disabilities. Freedom sometimes meant "free from" or "so free that"; 108 at other times
it embodied a more absolute notion; in other contexts it had political
overtones, as with Jews and alien merchants.
Moreover, the common law's own doctrines of freedom and villeinage embodied the complex fit between different social and legal understandings of freedom. As Maitland pointed out, English villeinage
was no ordinary doctrine of serfdom. 109 Instead of defining a class of
partly free laborers bound in serfage - a straightforward legal task common law set out a slippery set of doctrines in which a serf was
simultaneously wholly unfree (with respect to his lord) and wholly free
(with respect to the world). Consequently, medieval freedom is complex not only because it represented a moving line or unrealistically
corresponded to social divisions, but also because, at least in its common law formulation, it was relative and contingent. Freedom was a
line running through each serf, defining him as free or unfree depending on what he was doing and with whom. This is a startlingly modern conception, and likely it was too theoretical for judges to
TIONAL HISTORY, supra note 101, at 49, 54 (extracts from 1130 Pipe Roll). See generally J.C.
HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 49-61 (1st ed. 1965) (tradition of buying rights and exemptions).
105. S.F.C. MILSOM, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM 37 (1976). For
another view of early thirteenth-century legal change, see Robert Palmer, The Origins ofProperty
in England, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 1 (1985).
106. Paul Freedman, Catalan Lawyers and the Origins ofSerfdom, 48 MEDIEVAL STUD. 288,
289, 293, 297, 300, 302-04 (1986); PAUL FREEDMAN, THE ORIGINS OF PEASANT SERVITUDE IN
MEDIEVAL CATALONIA (1991) (expanding upon Catalan Lawyers and the Origins of Serfdom,
supra, and drawing similar conclusions for Spain).
107. Stacey, supra note 100, at 11.
108. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 5, at 129; Hilton, supra note 93, at 182.
109. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 5, at 415-21, 429-30; see also DAVIS, supra note
21, at 39 (qualifying Maitland's "relational freedom" model); HYAMS, supra note 59, at 125-60
(same).
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implement fully. But its mere formulation suggests how far medieval
freedom was from an inherited legal status, clear to all observers and
changeable only by flight or manumission.
Steinfeld's model of contingent labor freedom holds important lessons for reconstructing the changing, disputed notions of medieval
freedom. Narrowly, Steinfeld focuses on how early modem labor was
coerced and yet still understood as free, and how this changed in the
nineteenth century. But in broader terms, Steinfeld constructs a
model of freedom that rejects straight-line Whiggish evolutionism, denies the iron force of economic determinism on legal categorization,
and uses legal material to escape the common law's stated categories
of free and unfree. Steinfeld uses the insights of CLS to present a
nuanced model of early modem labor freedom. He succeeds in developing the disputed and multiplicitous meanings of legal freedom. His
argument and methodology will be instructive for those who seek to
extend his efforts to a period before his mid-fourteenth-century starting point.
Those who tum to Steinfeld's work for its English common law
teachings should be warned of one final point, however. Like much
CLS scholarship, Steinfeld's book is infused with a heavy dose of
American essentialism. His focus simply switches to America when
the narrative reaches 1700. The best parts of Steinfeld's story unfold
on this side of the Atlantic. Both the actual removal of specific performance and criminal sanctions from hired labor in the eighteenth
century (pp. 112-13) and the invention of the idea of modem free labor
in the nineteenth century (pp. 159-60) take place in America. Steinfeld follows the recent practice of stressing the rediscovered American
Revolution, which languished for so long in progressive historiography as a distant afterthought to the French, Russian, and even the socalled English Revolutions. Steinfeld's craftsmen and yeomen struggle
for and achieve the final repudiation of the ancient institutions of labor
servitude, partly because they are awakened by the Revolutionary experience and its ideology (pp. 123-27, 167). Of course, Steinfeld is far
too careful a historian to argue that England remained a nation of
deferential laborers with attitudes typified by the laborers in Ronald
Blythe's evocative Aken.field. 110 But he clearly concludes that practical and ideological changes unfolded first in America.
There are good reasons for focusing on American developments,
but Steinfeld's analysis of the emancipation of labor may be persuasive
enough to apply to English labor as well. He cites the work of Douglas Hay in support of the proposition that labor coercion stayed on the
books in English law until as late as the 1870s (pp. 115-16, 243 n.36,
244 n.46, 248 n.82). Clearly it did. 111 In fact, much of the old regulallO.

RONALD BLYTHE, AKENFIELD: PORTRAIT OF AN ENGLISH VILLAGE

110-15 (1969).

111. David Philips, The Black County Magistracy, 1835-60, 3 MIDLAND HIST. 161, 180-81
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tory labor framework remained, strengthened by the newer Combination Acts (1799 and 1801). But even in the early nineteenth century,
when the Combination Acts were in effect, laborers could seek higher
wages by way of a wage reassessment under the Statute of Artificers;
strangely, one of the decaying Tudor act's chief uses was to shield this
form of collective labor activity. 112 As the nineteenth century wore
on, important parts of the Combination Acts were repealed, as were
other oppressive labor rules. 113 Even during the early nineteenth-century heyday of coercive labor, the statutes were imperfect vehicles for
labor coercion, and English judges occasionally determined that the
common law of riot and conspiracy also failed to provide the tools to
crack down on a particular labor activity; 114 another instance of law
constraining those who made it. 115 In short, English labor law may
have been "contested" in much the same way as American law.
Nor was the configuration of English labor law chiefly the result of
legal weakness or political benevolence, as some have argued. 116 We
have a rich scholarship on English class formation and labor resistance
- including hundreds of strikes - in the eighteenth century. 117 As
long ago as the Webbs, scholars traced the fledgling but continuous
workingmen's institutions that were the seedbed of the union movement.118 These scholars found that working people were not only the
passive victims of industrialization, but that they formed institutions
that actively articulated their aspirations. As for the criminal sane(1976); Daphne Simon, Masters and Servants, in DEMOCRACY AND THE LABOUR MOVEMENT
160 (John Saville ed., 1954); D.C. Woods, The Operation of the Master and Servants Act in the
Black Country, 1858-1875, 7 MIDLAND HIST. 93 (1982); see also Ralph Shlomowitz, On Punishments and Rewards in Coercive Labor Systems: Comparative Perspectives, 12 SLAVERY & ABOLITION 97, 100 (1991) (criminal sanctions in Australia as well).
112. RULE, supra note 30, at 116-18.
These famous enactments [the general Combination laws] by forbidding trade unionism for
straightforward wage demands, made a legal issue such as the enforcement of 5 Elizabeth
[the Statute of Artificers] especially valuable. To organise journeymen for the purpose of
petitioning Parliament, or for the purpose of funding prosecutions under the law [i.e., prosecutions of employers for violating 5 Elizabeth] could not be regarded as illegal ....
Id. at 116; see COLE & POSTGATEsupra note 41, at 175-76; DOROTHY MARSHALL, INDUSTRIAL
ENGLAND 1776-1851, at 145 (1973).
113. For a useful chronology, see John V. Orth, The Law ofStrikes, 1847-1871, in LAW AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN BRITISH HISTORY 126 (J.A. Guy & H.G. Beale eds., 1984), and John v.
Orth, The Legal Status of English Trade Unions, 1799-1871, in LAW-MAKING AND LAW-MAKERS IN BRITISH HISTORY 195 (Alan Harding ed., 1980) [hereinafter Orth, The Legal Status].
114. THOMPSON, supra note 36, at 507, 526 (Statute of Artificers as basis for criminal prosecutions); Orth, The Legal Status, supra note 113, at 197-99.
115. See supra note 64.
116. See, e.g., LINDER, supra note 33, at 103-04 (prolabor provisions in English law result
from concessions by the ruling class, while the driving force behind prolabor provisions in American law was the working class itself).
117. RULE, supra note 30, chs. 4, 6, 7; STEVENSON, supra note 38, at 113-35; THOMPSON,
supra note 36.
118. RULE, supra note 30, at 149-51 (citing Webbs' limited definition of unionism and eighteenth-century examples).
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tions, those whom the law punished for leaving work were frequently
not errant individuals, but individuals and groups participating in
strikes, particularly in the mines and the iron industry. 119 In other
words, the English criminal sanctions are best seen as a peripheral feature in the larger context of a collective class struggle. That the criminal sanctions lasted longer in England is less important than the fact
that, in both countries, organizing and collective work stoppages were
illegal and remained so, and that working people challenged this illegality against the odds. They did so by using the rhetoric of rights and
revolution, even if English activists did not use the rhetoric of popular
republicanism that historians have identified in the American
discourse.
The parallel evolution of English and American labor law also existed in areas outside of the direct regulation of wage labor. Thus, the
abolition movement against slavery began its uneven rise in the late
eighteenth century in both England and America. Among whites, it
began as a cause of the middle classes, but abolition also gained modest acceptance among working people in both countries. 120 Both
countries abolished the slave trade and then slavery, in stages. Finally,
after black emancipation in both the British Empire and America, employers attempted to employ Asian contract labor; in other words, as
Steinfeld concludes in the American context (pp. 177-84), it was still
not inevitable that coerced labor was deemed to be slavery or that the
abolition of the latter meant the end of the various forms of peonage.121 Overall, both English and American law repudiated slave labor over the course of the nineteenth century, and in both countries
working people, and eventually the law as well, came to view all forms
of coerced labor as uncomfortably akin to slavery. The picture that
emerges is one of parallelism, not American innovation, giving Steinfeld's model of labor emancipation even broader application than he
attempts.
In fact, the question might better be framed not in terms of
whether legal change occurred first in America, but why CLS legal
history focuses on change here. The explanation lies at the heart of
119. A.H. MANCHESTER, A MODERN LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND & WALES 1750-1950,
at 328 (1980); Simon, supra note 111, at 171-72, 190, 194-95; Woods, supra note 111, at 93, 98,
111.
120. PHILIP s. FONER, BRmSH LABOR AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR (1981); Eric
Foner, Abolitionism and the Labor Movement in Antebellum America, in ANTI-SLAVERY, RELIGION AND REFORM 254 (Christine Bolt & Seymour Drescher eds., 1980). But see Patricia Hollis,
Anti-Slavery and British Working-Class Radicalism in the Years of Reform, in ANTI-SLAVERY,
RELIGION AND REFORM, supra, at 294 (intense English working-class distrust of middle-class
abolitionists).
121. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 11-13, 18-20 (1944) (reviewing repeated efforts of state
legislatures to devise constitutionally acceptable servitude); Taylor v. United States, 244 F. 321
(4th Cir. 1917) (forcible return to contractual terms of service is not within antipeonage statute);
Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 681-82, 685-90 (D. Ala. 1903) (allowing certain terms of compelled
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CLS. A major strand of CLS scholarship is devoted to unpacking,
even deconstructing, mainstream legal doctrine. Special emphasis has
always been devoted to legal history in general, and to late nineteenthcentury formalism in particular, to explain legal change under American industrial capitalism. 122 If this can be done at the expense of
"straight" scholarship, so much the better - hence the CLS tradition
of "trashing." 123 The result has been entertaining and important analytic work but also a perceived reluctance to articulate a positive program, a failure for which even sympathetic observers have criticized
the movement. 124
Like earlier radicals, however, at least some in the CLS movement
have found a provisional agenda in modern, radicalized readings of
foundational American legal texts, notably the Declaration of Independence. This is why so many scholars want to appropriate Thomas
Jefferson and his legacy.12s
Perhaps the obscure case of Robertson v. Baldwin 126 holds the clue
to Steinfeld's focus on the American invention of free labor. The
Supreme Court held that runaway sailors could be seized and compelled to finish their terms of service, notwithstanding the Thirteenth
Amendment. Steinfeld cites the case to illustrate the persistence of
traditionalist notions of coerced labor (p. 251 n.36). But Justice
Harlan's Jeffersonian dissent speaks more directly to Steinfeld's project: Who cares about inherited common law structures? We are
Americans, new men, created and, in the Reconstruction Amendments, recreated as a nation under the sheltering wing of new
emancipatory ideas. We can do better. It is this fundamental American vision that continues to animate the work of Steinfeld and others.

122. Guyora Binder, What's Left?, 69 TEXAS L. REv. 1985, 2002-07 (1991) (explaining the
focus on late nineteenth-century formalism); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36
STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984) (discussing CLS interest in doctrinal legal history).
123. Mark G. Kelman, Trashing. 36 STAN. L. REv. 293 (1984) (explaining the trashing
technique).
124. Eugene D. Genovese, Critical Legal Studies as Radical Politics and World View, 3 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 131, 134-48 (1991) (reviewing MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRmCAL LEGAL
STUDIES (1987)) (leftist critique of CLS); Phillip E. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to Be Radical?, 36 STAN. L. REV. 247, 281-89 (1984) (liberal critique of CLS).
125. "It is a curious phenomenon of American scholarship that everyone wants Jefferson on
their side." Joyce Appleby, Historians, Community, and the Pursuit of Jefferson: Comment on
Professor Tom/ins, 4 STUD. AMER. PoL. DEV. 35, 41 (1990), cited in Ernst, supra note 90, at
1062 n.284. Outside oflegal scholarship and CLS, see, for example, the essays collected in JEFFERSONIAN LEGACIES (Peter S. Onuf ed., 1993), especially Paul Finkelman's passionate Jefferson
and Slaves: "Treason Against the Hopes of the World," in, id. at 181.
126. 165 U.S. 275, 293-97, 302 (1897) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

